Kerberos @ Columbia University

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Overview

- Basic Facts
- Web Authentication
- Other Authentication
- Database Propagation
- GULP
- AD Interop
- Two-Factor Authentication
- Upcoming Work

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Basic facts

- 367K principals (was 341K last year)
    - 80K from current students, faculty & staff
    - Alumni
    - 600 host/service principals (central IT mostly)
    - Other
- 4 x 1-way trusts from various AD domains
- Many AD domains across campuses
    - No forest
- Running MIT krb5 1.9.1 on KDCs
    - 2 x RHEL5 64-bit 1U servers

Basic facts

- User principals provisioned based on data-feeds from HR, Registrar & departments
- All users have central "UNI" & possibly various AD passwords (might have different usernames)
- Most users use plaintext passwords, not GSSAPI
    - Easy to roll out
- GSSAPI used heavily for server-to-server authn/encryption
- 2.4M AS_REQ/day
- 1.8M TGS_REQ/day

Web Authentication

- Currently
  - Wind (CAS derivative)
    - Allows principal and demographic ACLs
  - Pamacea
    - Allows above + anything supported by .htaccess/.htpasswd
  - Shibboleth
- Next
  - Looking at CAS, Cosign, etc
  - Want to consolidate on single, unified authentication system
  - Must support guests

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Other Authentication

- RADIUS
  - Wireless authentication
  - VPN concentrators
  - Router/switch logins by Network Engineers
  - Dial-up modems

Database Propagation Challenges – Solved!

- Used to have 550K principals that we kprop'd 1x/day
    - Deleted 210K principals so kprop was faster
- Switched to iprop last winter
    - Our monitoring system uncovered a bug when kvno hits 255
    - Otherwise, iprop rules!

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GULP: Grand Unified Logging Program

- GULP helps Securty Team automate lock-outs
- Detect suspicious logins
  - User logging in from 2 countries in too short a time
  - User logging in after multitude of failures
  - Too many users logging in from the same device
- Users are locked out and Security Team is notified

AD Interop

- AD supports 4K users of Exchange, filesharing, etc
- CTO declared that passwords must be sync'd between AD and MIT KDC
- Realm referral doesn't play nice
  - Non-member workstations & Exchange 2010 were a show-stopped
- Looked at krb5-sync instead of having trusts
- Implemented krb5-adsync instead
  - http://code.google.com/p/krb5-adsync/
  - Allows sync'ing only some users based on DN

Two-Factor Authentication

- Deployed RSA SecurID for IT sysadmins on Windows, Linux, and Solaris
  - Wrote our own PAM module
  - Removed it from Windows servers since it didn't provide adequate protection
  - Cost prohibitive to roll it out for all 80K on-campus users, or all 367K principals
- Looking at OATH-based solutions
  - We would write a server & PAM module
  - Users could use free/low-cost OATH-compliant tokens
    - Yubikey
    - Google Authenticator

Upcoming

- Need to finish re-keying host/service principals
- Enable preauth for user principals
    - Need to test legacy applications (or just retire them already)
- Upgrade clients to krb5 1.9
- Use hardware tokens for preauth?
- Disable weak encryption types
    - Need to retire JDK 1.4/1.5 apps